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When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States and its allies expected that future 
competition with Russia would revolve around economic and not military matters.1 Given 
Moscow’s low prioritisation of maintaining military strength and modernising its armed forces 
at the time, this was not an unreasonable assumption. During the final years of the Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev had started to steer the country away from its reliance on military 
power for global competition and instead pursued a wider variety of state instruments for 
asserting international status. In the early 1990s Yeltsin continued on the course of restoring 
the country’s status not through military might, but through pursuing political and economic 
stability and cooperation with the West. Under his leadership, in the matter of a few years, the 
size of the former Soviet military had been cut in half, spending on defence was reduced by 
three quarters and the procurement of new military equipment ground almost to a halt.2 Within 
this context, the United States and its allies worked on the assumption that Russia intended to 
continue to demilitarise and took active steps to support this process. Significant financial 
support was provided to aid the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, to dismantle 
the nuclear arsenal and to convert the military industrial complex into civilian production.3 
Efforts at building defence cooperation with Russia were also made, both bilaterally and under 
the umbrella of the NATO Partnership for Peace. Assisting Moscow in transforming the 
remnants of the Red Army into a force geared towards local conflicts and ‘soft’ security threats, 
including peacekeeping and emergency response, was a particular focus, because it was 
assumed that this would be the major area of Russian military activities in the future. The hope 
was that by cooperating with Moscow in this way, it would be possible to ‘help steer Russian 
military planning toward international peacekeeping missions rather than great-power rivalry’ 
and to assist the country’s modernisation at the same time as preventing a future challenge to 
US military superiority.4 
The view that the ultimate aim of Russian military modernisation was, or at least ought to be, 
the creation of armed forces configured mostly for local, low-intensity wars, was a mainstay in 
Western expectations until the 2010s. A military that was ‘mobile, flexible and…combat-ready 
for scenarios like local conflicts and asymmetrical warfare’5 was considered to be in Moscow’s 
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best interest in order to enable it to deal with the ‘small-scale soft security threats [Russia] 
should anticipate in the future’.6 In other words, an army geared for small-war fighting was 
seen as sufficient for addressing the country’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ vis-à-vis areas of 
instability in its neighbourhood,7 whilst at the same time preventing the ‘familiar Soviet pattern 
of engaging in far-flung adventures’.8 Such views on the future of the Russian military persisted 
in spite of the fact that its military doctrines since 1993 continued addressing ‘traditional’ 
conflict scenarios and the need for requisite war-fighting capabilities. Although Kremlin 
leaders, at least since the mid-1990s, never unambiguously indicated that the country had 
relinquished its great-power ambitions, including in the military realm, there was a tendency 
to explain the expression of concerns about scenarios and capabilities beyond local conflict 
management as concessions made to conservative generals unable to move on from the Cold 
War.9 It is within this context that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military aggression 
against Ukraine since 2014, followed by the involvement in the Syrian civil war from 2015, 
took many in the West by surprise. These actions did not correspond to expectations about the 
future of Russian military power, instead signalling the country’s unexpected return to 
‘geopolitical rivalries’.10  
This article argues that small war renewal was never the major focus of Russian views on 
military transformation and the utility of force. Tracing the country’s experience of war and 
conflict regionally and internationally since the end of the Cold War, and the impact this had 
on the Kremlin’s views on what kind of armed forces it desired, the article sets out to show that 
Moscow’s military ambitions started to diverge dramatically from Western expectations as 
early as the mid-1990s. Small war renewal was an aspect in Russian deliberations on the future 
of military power. However, as a result of what Jakob Kipp described as a ‘strategic culture 
rooted in its Eurasia setting, committed to its great power status and defined by persistent 
concerns over foreign intervention in its periphery’, Moscow never really saw armed forces 
geared towards new-war type scenarios as sufficient for the protection of national interests and 
security.11 Growing concerns over the US monopoly on the use of force and the portrayal of 
Western military interventions as a threat to regional and international stability meant that the 
pursuit of ‘full-spectrum conventional, unconventional and nuclear capabilities’ soon returned 
to the core of military ambitions.12 Since the turn of the millennium, moreover, growing 
preoccupation with internal order and regime stability has reinforced official discourse of a 
West hostile to Russia’s interests in order to justify the increasing centralisation of domestic 
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political process. In combination, these factors meant that Russia’s military revival, which 
came to the world’s attention in 2014, has been long in the making.  
Small war renewal 
The end of Cold War superpower competition meant that small wars, intra-state conflicts and 
insurgencies, which at best had been seen as a peripheral task of the armed forces, started to 
emerge as an increasingly important concern both in for the United States and for Russia. Both 
superpowers’ militaries had been configured for large-scale conventional warfare in land and 
naval theatres, as well as for strategic defence against existential external threats. This left them 
militarily, doctrinally and politically unprepared for the task of dealing efficiently with wars at 
the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The United States started the process of transforming 
its armed forces from a position of strength, having emerged from the Cold War as the world’s 
sole superpower with an intact military and economy. In the absence of a defined state 
competitor to measure its capabilities against, it decided to size its military on the ‘two-war’ 
standard, which meant maintaining armed forces strong enough to deal with two concurrent 
major regional wars. Russia, in contrast, entered the new era as a mere shadow of its former 
self and faced the challenge not only of building a national military from the remnants of the 
Soviet army, but also of fundamentally rebuilding its political system and salvaging a collapsed 
economy.13 Preoccupied with the demands of urgent political, social and economic problems, 
the systematic adaptation of security and defence policies was not an immediate priority and 
there was a distinct lack of clarity on guidelines and doctrines regarding Russia’s security 
interests and the military reforms required to protect them.14 
In the early 1990s, for the newly established Russian Federation, its armed forces’ 
unpreparedness to deal with small wars and insurgencies quickly emerged as the most 
immediate concern. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the eruption of a 
number of violent clashes on Russia’s periphery and within its own borders. Its armed forces 
were drawn into conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), 
Tajikistan and later Chechnya before relevant guidelines and doctrines had been worked out. 
According to some estimates, by the end of 1992 more than 27,000 Russian soldiers were 
engaged in various trouble spots in the area, increasing to 36,000 by the end of 1993.15 Chaos 
and contingency determined Russia’s involvement in some of these conflicts almost by default. 
Before the political and military leaderships had a chance to decide on a clear strategic vision, 
soldiers that were still stationed in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan came under fire from local 
paramilitary forces, often demanding weapons. The situation became so serious that in 1992 
defence minister Pavel Grachev permitted troops in conflict zones to defend themselves 
without direct orders from Moscow.16 As a result, as Pavel Baev put it, in the early 1990s the 
Kremlin had no choice but to ‘adjust its course of action according to the military realities’.17  
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The eruption of violent clashes across the former Soviet region was a regional and international 
security concern and, in the absence of other actors willing or able to step up to the task, Russian 
military intervention there was almost inevitable. The civil war in Tajikistan quickly turned 
into a threat to the entire region.18 Its long and poorly defended border with Afghanistan stoked 
fears over lawlessness, crime, insurgency and extremism spilling over into Central Asia and 
beyond. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia caused concern about the potential 
overspill of hostilities and instability into the Russian side of the North Caucasus, which 
already was unstable.19 In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia was 
the only country in the region that had anything even approximating a functioning military and 
some of the other newly independent states looked toward it as a provider of security.20 A 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in 1992 had agreed to establish a joint 
corps of military observers and units for peacekeeping missions.21 In reality, however, only 
Russia was in a position to contribute troops to these operations, which meant that this mandate 
was only nominal.22 These 1990s interventions did not correspond to international norms of 
peacekeeping. They were dominated by Russian forces, rarely impartial and often criticised for 
excessive use of force. ‘Peacekeeping’ forces were deployed where Russian soldiers already 
had been fighting and, in some cases, these were drawn from the same troops.23 At a summit 
meeting in Moscow in 1994 US President Bill Clinton reminded Yeltsin that peacekeeping had 
to adhere to internationally accepted principles. However, he also conceded that Russia had a 
role to play in the region similar to the US’s commitments in Panama and Grenada.24 
Given developments on the ground, the need to develop relevant guidelines and capabilities for 
fighting small wars and insurgencies became an important aspect in Russian strategic thinking 
and doctrine. The country’s first military doctrine adopted in 1993 focused on the threat of 
ethnic and internal armed conflict, because this was an immediate military challenge to national 
security. Subsequent versions of the doctrine published in 2000, 2010 and 2014 also reflected 
changing international security priorities. ‘New’ challenges to stability in the form of 
extremism, ethnic strife and religiously motivated terrorism within Russia’s own borders, in its 
neighbourhood and beyond, took an increasingly important place. In the early 1990s, the 
Russian leadership saw engagement in UN peacekeeping as an important way to integrate with 
international security organisations. Russian troops contributed to various protection and 
stabilisation forces in the Balkans from 1992 and worked alongside NATO troops as part of 
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KFOR until 2003. Russian peacekeeping there differed considerably from the operations in the 
CIS. Experience gained through cooperation brought Russian peacekeeping doctrines more 
into line with the views of the UN and also informed reforms of its security apparatus.25 KFOR 
improved interoperability with NATO and led to the development of a Generic Concept of 
Joint NATO-Russian Peacekeeping Operations.26 Recognising that many ‘new’ security 
challenges transcend national borders and require an international response, Russia also started 
seeking more cooperation in areas such as emergency response, disaster management, 
counterdrug operations and counterterrorism under the auspices of the UN, the NATO-Russia 
Council and on a bilateral basis.27 Following 9/11, Moscow pledged support to the US in the 
‘Global War on Terrorism’ and continued cooperation in this area even when relations became 
tense at the time of the Iraq war in 2003. Russia-NATO military-to-military cooperation in the 
area of emerging security challenges continued until it was stopped after the annexation of 
Crimea.28 
Lessons from regional conflicts during the early 1990s informed Russian thinking about what 
kind of armed forces the country required. Given the military’s poor performance, particularly 
in Chechnya, it soon became a consensus view that the creation of armed forces able to deal 
effectively with regional conflicts, especially in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, was 
essential.29 Personnel from various paramilitary forces, for example the Ministry of Emergency 
Situation’s civil defence troops and the FSB’s counterterrorism units, were able to make up for 
the shortcomings of the regular armed forces in some areas. However, it was clear that the mass 
mobilisation military relying heavily on conscription was a relic in urgent need of reform. 
Throughout the 1990s, an important strand in Russian strategic thinking pressed for a 
significant increase in the number of professional soldiers (or even a fully professional 
military), as well as for improvements in permanent readiness, mobility and rapid reaction.30 
Some progress in improving capabilities in small war fighting was made during the 1990s, as 
the improved operational performance in the second Chechen war from 1999 onwards 
demonstrated.31 However, only the 2008 reform programme led to fundamental change in this 
area. Heavily influenced by those strategists that had pushed for improving capabilities 
required to deal with small wars and insurgencies,32 serious changes were implemented with 
impressive speed. Legacy mobilisation units manned only by a skeleton staff of officers were 
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replaced with smaller, more deployable units with permanent readiness. The number of 
professional soldiers steadily increased. Troops were provided with modern equipment and 
changes were made to education and training in order to enhance mobility and combat 
readiness. New Special Operations Forces, trained for deployment across various combat 
missions, including counterterrorism, were also created in 2011.33 As the annexation of Crimea 
demonstrated, the 2008 reform programme led to advances in tactical art, operational skills and 
equipment that turned the Russian military from a blunt instrument into a force equipped to 
deal efficiently with the requirements of wars at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.  
Status and military power 
Contingency and insecurity drew Russia into a variety of conflicts in the CIS region in the early 
1990s. The poor performance of its armed forces there turned small war renewal into an 
important consideration for the configuration of its future forces. However, regional and 
international status concerns soon emerged as a reason for why military modernisation above 
and beyond improving capabilities for small wars and insurgencies again became a priority. In 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s future role in the region 
was uncertain and subject to significant domestic disagreement.34 Its is clear, however, that 
Moscow always assumed that its dominant position there was a given and would be recognized 
both by its neighbours and the world. In addition to the need to counter sources of instability 
on its periphery, a dominant position in the former Soviet region was seen as essential to protect 
economic and strategic interests and to ensure reliable allies, which the country had 
traditionally lacked. As early as 1992, the chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet’s Committee 
for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Evgenii Ambartsumov, asserted that ‘as 
the internationally recognized legal successor to the USSR, the [Russian Federation] must 
proceed in its foreign policy from a doctrine declaring all the geopolitical space of the former 
Union as the sphere of its vital interests…and must seek the world community’s understanding 
and recognition of its [special] interests in this space’.35  
By 1993 a moderate nationalist vision, where Russia, as a primus inter pares, would carry out 
its responsibilities as security guarantor in the CIS - preferably through multilateral 
organisations but also unilaterally if required – emerged as a consensus view in the political 
elite.36 The foreign policy concept issued in the same year laid out Russia’s claims to what it 
saw as its interests, rights and responsibilities and the 1993 military doctrine implied the 
intention to play greater role in the region. As Yeltsin explained it:  
Russia continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflict in the 
territory of the former USSR. Moreover, the world community is increasingly coming 
to realise our country’s special responsibility in this difficult matter. I believe the time 
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has come…to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in this 
region’.37  
Until the mid-1990s the United States and the West, preoccupied with developments within 
Russia itself, did not treat the rest of the CIS as a priority area. Criticism of the military 
interventions there, like that voiced by Clinton above, tended to focus on Russian violations of 
norms of international behaviour, but did not fundamentally question the country’s right to 
seek stability in the region.38 It is not inconceivable that Moscow, at least implicitly, understood 
the West’s relative lack of interest as tacit approval of its self-declared role as the regional 
security guarantor and hegemon.  
By the mid-1990s it emerged, perhaps unexpectedly for Russia, that neither the West nor its 
CIS neighbours shared its long-term vision for the region. As the CIS states developed their 
own foreign and security policies, they cooperated with Russia when it suited them, but also 
kept an open mind to other options. The United States and its allies started taking a stronger 
interest in the CIS region, politically and economically, but also in the area of security. This 
included tougher diplomatic positions on Russia’s approach to the ongoing conflicts and 
promises of financial aid and closer ties with NATO to the countries affected. Emboldened by 
Western support, political leaders of those states fearing Russian domination became more 
outspoken in their criticism of Moscow’s policies like Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze, who called for a ‘Bosnian model’ solution to the conflict in Abkhazia with a 
stronger role for NATO.39 In Moscow, the view of Western cooperation with its CIS 
neighbours as a strategy for isolating and containing Russia started to emerge.40 In 1994, 
cautioning against NATO enlargement towards the East, Yeltsin told his CIS neighbours that 
‘the euphoria of free sailing in the stormy sea of independence was over’, and  warned the West 
that the downsizing of Russia’s armed forces as a ‘unilateral concession’ would end.41 In 1997, 
he reiterated that his country was not prepared to stand by while the West was trying to ‘nullify 
Russia’s presence’ in the region, stating unambiguously that he would do everything to prevent 
the formation of ‘anti-Russian buffer states’.42 
In spite of these loud rejections of what the Kremlin perceived as unwarranted Western 
encroachment into its declared sphere of interest, Russian military activities in the CIS region 
in reality became more restrained around the mid-1990s. The quagmire in Chechnya and 
growing resource constraints on the military were likely reasons for this, but also the fact that 
Russia at the time simply did not have the power – militarily and economically – to pursue its 
desire to keep the West out of the region. Some observers in the West mistakenly assumed at 
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the time that this signalled Russia’s readiness to ‘back down’ or to make a ‘military-strategic 
retreat’ from the region.43 Fears over the encroachment of the West and of NATO into its 
declared ‘sphere of interest’, and the intention to counter this, continued being a central feature 
in foreign policy and appeared in all versions of the military doctrine since 1993. From 2010 
onwards, the Russian military doctrine explicitly named NATO enlargement and the movement 
of NATO infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders as the top external military danger to 
security.  
Although the intensity of Russian military activities in the region waned in the mid-1990s, 
Moscow consistently maintained a significant military presence in various CIS states, including 
large numbers of troops in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.44 This gave it a permanent 
foothold in strategically significant ‘outposts’ and also offered a powerful future lever for 
political influence and pressure. Operations in the CIS region during the 1990s were presented 
in the language of multilateral peacekeeping, which the Kremlin saw as preferable at a time 
when it assumed its dominant role in the region was a given. Its conduct there became more 
aggressive when some of the CIS states took a decisive turn to the West, a process that, in the 
eyes of the Kremlin, the latter actively encouraged. When Russia’s military and economic 
strength started to recover, it abandoned the image of benign security guarantor and 
demonstrated, both in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, that its dominant status in the 
region was non-negotiable. 
Fears over losing its political, economic and military-strategic sphere of influence to the West, 
and especially to NATO, strongly informed Moscow’s views on the required scale and scope 
of future military transformation. With regards to asserting dominance over the CIS countries 
themselves, improving capabilities for small war fighting would have been sufficient. Although 
the operational performance of Russian forces during the 1990s was far from stellar, they never 
risked a comprehensive defeat, because in terms of quantity and quality they outrivalled the 
capabilities of all other former Soviet states. Small war competencies did nothing, however, 
for feelings of weakness vis-à-vis the United States’ conventional superiority and insecurity in 
the face of NATO’s growing influence in the CIS region. Russian concerns were exacerbated 
by the display of NATO’s strength in the Balkans. When Operation Allied Force (OAF) 
forcefully disposed of the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, in spite of strong opposition 
from Russia who regarded him as an ally, this further fanned fears that, unless its military 
weakness was dealt with, Moscow would not be able to prevent potential intrusions by the 
West into its more direct sphere of influence in the future.45 As the Russian defence expert, 
Aleksei Arbatov, had noted already in 2000, OAF ‘marked a watershed in Russia’s assessment 
of its own military requirements and defense priorities’.46 
Russia’s growing preoccupation with its regional status went hand in hand with concerns over 
the permanent loss of its international status as a major global power. Fears that the United 
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States, relying on military might, was intent on establishing itself as the hegemonic power 
whilst keeping Russia on its knees and preventing Moscow from having a say in the solution 
of developments of global importance emerged as early as 1992. The need to counter this 
eventuality became an established view from the mid-1990s with the appointment of Evgenii 
Primakov as foreign minister, and a mainstay of Russian foreign policy following OAF in 
1999.47 In the run-up to OAF, Moscow had argued that decisions on actions taken against 
Milosevic should be made by the UN and authorised by the Security Council, which included 
Russia and other major powers. When NATO proceeded without a Security Council 
Resolution, the Kremlin viewed this as a blatant disregard of international law and as evidence, 
as Charles Ziegler put it, that ‘Washington expects Russia to subordinate itself to the US-
dominated international hierarchy that emerged after 1991.48 NATO’s justification of OAF as 
a humanitarian intervention was a particular bone of contention and exacerbated the Kremlin’s 
fears over its future ability to pursue an independent foreign policy in its near abroad and 
beyond. Moscow’s conviction that the West was using humanitarian principles as a pretext to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of other states to expand its own power and influence emerged. 
As Yeltsin noted in an address to the OSCE in 1999, European security was endangered, in his 
view, by ‘calls for “humanitarian intervention” – a new idea – in the international affairs of 
another state, even when they are made under the pretext of defending human rights and 
freedoms’.49 The crisis in the Balkans, including joint peacekeeping efforts, seemed to offer an 
opportunity to establish closer cooperation between Russia and the West in solving global 
security issues. Ultimately, Moscow’s perception that its views were not taken sufficiently into 
account meant that it led instead to the first serious breakdown in relations. The feeling of being 
excluded from decision-making motivated the Kremlin to adopt a more confrontational 
approach towards the West, because it confirmed to the political and military elite that the 
country ‘has to rely on military strength, rather than on illusions about justice and good 
intentions in international relations’.50 From 2000 onwards, strengthening the military became 
a priority as this seemed indispensable to protect the country’s ability to act as an independent 
pole in international politics, whose views could not be ignored. Interventions leading to regime 
change in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011, which Moscow had strongly opposed, were seen 
as further evidence that military weakness curtailed the country’s international clout and 
freedom of actions. As Putin put it in 2012: 
The basic principles of international law are being degraded and eroded, especially in 
terms of international security. Under these circumstances, Russia cannot fall back on 
diplomatic and economic methods alone to settle contradiction and resolve conflict. 
Our country faces the task of developing its military potential as part of a deterrence 
strategy and at a sufficient level. Its armed forces, special services and other security-
related agencies should be prepared for quick and effective responses to new 
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challenges. This is an indispensable condition for Russia to feel secure and for our 
partners to heed our country’s arguments in various international formats.51 
Throughout the 1990s, owing to the decay of conventional military capabilities, Russia relied 
on a strong nuclear arsenal for securing itself against the potential of existential threats to its 
security. Whilst this was sufficient for deterring potential invasion and direct attack by a 
conventionally superior adversary, it soon became clear that the effectiveness of nuclear 
weapons against less direct threats to interests that were nonetheless seen as vital – such as 
protecting its dominant position in the ‘near abroad’ or its ability to curtail what it saw as the 
United States’ monopoly on the use of force - was limited. The need to balance a strong nuclear 
deterrent with conventional capabilities for a more flexible response, including cutting-edge 
technologies for land, air and naval warfare and a substantial degree of mobilisation and mass,  
became an important focus in Russian thinking and reform efforts.52 The expensive journey 
towards the revival of conventional military power started in earnest from 2000 onwards when, 
aided by a recovering economy and a Gross Domestic Product that experienced impressive 
growth rates from 1999 until 2008, the defence budget increased dramatically. Efforts to 
rebuild a serious conventional force accelerated with the modernisation programme in 2008. A 
key element of this was an ambitious State Armament Programme with the aim of modernising 
70 percent of all equipment by 2020. Although not every target was achieved in full, an 
impressive quantity and quality of new hardware, weapons and equipment has been delivered 
to all branches of service.53 An element of conscription was maintained to ensure the desired 
size of the armed forces, which has been fixed at a maximum of a million by presidential 
decree. At the same time, the number of professional soldiers has been growing especially in 
rapid reaction units and in specialist positions involving the operation of advanced equipment 
and weaponry.54 Structural changes, technological renewal and increasing professionalization 
were complemented by adjustments to the education and training of troops in order to enhance 
combat readiness. Increased funding meant that large-scale military exercises, which were 
unaffordable for almost two decades, were reintroduced in 2009.55 Since 2011, inter-service 
exercises involving up to 150,000 men have been held on a regular basis, preparing the all 
armed services for joint and combined combat operations.56  
Increased funding and more systematic attention paid to the armed forces had already led to 
serious improvements in conventional capabilities by the time of the war against Georgia in 
August 2008. On the one hand, the operations revealed that significant shortcomings, especially 
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in the area of command, control and communication had yet to be overcome, and these were 
addressed by the modernisation programme announced in the autumn of the same year. On the 
other hand, Russia achieved its aim of expelling Georgia – a conventional opponent using 
similar equipment and tactics – from South Ossetia within a matter of five days, demonstrating 
that its capabilities had ‘improved considerably compared with the 1990s’.57 During the air 
strikes in Syria from 2015, the Kremlin showed that the modernisation of its conventional 
military might had yielded the the sea and airlift capabilities required for out-of-area operations 
on a global scale. This air campaign would have been categorically beyond the realm of 
possibilities just a decade earlier.58  
In terms of spending, combined manpower, sophistication of available technology and combat 
experience, Russia’s conventional military power still has a way to go to catch up with the 
United States and NATO. However, the achievements of reforms and increased spending since 
2000 have made the Kremlin much more confident in having the power to maintain its grip 
over its sphere of interest and to have a say in the course of international events. Russia’s 
aggression against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine since 2014 sent a stark warning to all 
CIS states that any attempts to break from its orbit would come at serious cost. Arguably, 
conspicuous display of regained conventional capabilities and the evident willingness to use 
them will also play into considerations by NATO and the West about their future role in the 
region. In Syria, Russia showed that it now had the capabilities to challenge what it saw as the 
US’s monopoly on the use of force on a global level and to get a say in the course of events 
relevant to its national interests. Certainly, this will have to factor into the West’s use of military 
force in certain situations in the future, because the danger of spiralling tensions and escalation 
with Russia will need to be taken into account. 
Regime stability 
The need for equipping the armed forces with the skills to deal more effectively with sources 
of instability on the country’s periphery and the protection of the country’s status, both 
regionally and globally, have not been the only factors influencing Russian thinking about 
military transformation and the future of war and conflict. Concerns over threats to internal 
order and regime stability have also influenced this thinking, especially since the turn of the 
millennium. As Lilia Shevtsova wrote towards the end of Putin’s first two terms in office, 
‘Russia’s foreign policy has become an important tool for achieving the Kremlin’s domestic 
objectives. And a key foreign policy objective is to create the image of a hostile international 
environment and demonstrate a strong reaction to which it can legitimize the hyper-
centralization of Kremlin power, top-down governance, and its crackdown on political 
pluralism’.59 In other words, in the Kremlin’s thinking about future war and conflict, ‘the outer 
aggression and the inner repression are reinforcing each other’.60  
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Moscow’s criticism of what it describes as Western meddling in the domestic affairs of other 
states – through humanitarian intervention, but also by political means and democracy 
promotion – has been based on the argument made consistently since the end of the 1990s that 
such actions violate the core principle of sovereignty of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of other states. This criticism dates back to OAF as noted above and accelerated with the 2003 
war in Iraq and the intervention in Libya in 2011. As Putin noted in an article published in 
Moskovskie novosti in 2012, ‘armed conflicts that are launched under the pretext of 
humanitarian goals are undermining the time-honoured principle of state sovereignty. They are 
creating a void in the moral and legal implications of international relations’. With reference 
to developments in the Arab Spring and the Libya intervention in 2011, he continued:  
Russia sympathised with those seeking democratic reforms. However, it soon became 
clear that developments in many countries did not follow a civilised scenario. Instead 
of establishing democracy and protecting the rights of the minority, there was a push to 
dispose of an opponent and to stage a coup, replacing one dominant force with another, 
even more aggressive one […] The deterioration of the situation in this case was the 
result of outside intervention in support of one party in an internal conflict’.61  
Since 2003, popular demands for political change across various countries in the CIS region 
that became known as the ‘colour revolutions’ have been increasingly designated as a security 
threat in official Russian discourse. Based on the allegation that these revolutions were 
instigated and encouraged by external political meddling, ‘colour revolutions’ are routinely 
conflated with Western military interventions and thereby militarised as a potential threat to 
Russia’s own sovereignty.62 As Putin noted already in 2004 following the Rose and Orange 
Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine: 
As far as all post-Soviet space is concerned, I am concerned above all about attempts 
to resolve legal issues by illegal means. That is the most dangerous thing. It is the most 
dangerous thing to think up a system of permanent revolutions – now the Rose 
Revolution, or the Blue Revolution. One should get used to living according to the law, 
rather than according to political expediency defined elsewhere for some or other nation 
– that is what worries me most.63 
By 2014, in the aftermath of Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea, 
the Kremlin had linked what it routinely describes as Western-instigated ‘colour revolutions’ 
to extremism and portrayed this as a threat with serious implications for external and internal 
security.64 As Putin explained at a meeting with the Security Council: 
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In the modern world extremism is often used as a geopolitical instrument to rearrange 
spheres of influence. We see the tragic consequences of the wave of so-called ‘colour 
revolutions’, the turmoil in the countries that have undergone the irresponsible 
experiments of covert and sometimes blatant interference in their lives. We take this 
as a lesson and a warning, and we must do everything necessary to ensure this never 
happens in Russia […] As we assert our freedom of choice, the right to hold meetings, 
marches and rallies, we should not forget that we are responsible for our words 
and deeds. We must know and bear in mind that […] particularly calls for a violent 
overthrow of the existing regime are direct manifestations of anti-national thinking 
and extremism.65 
Clearly, a principled stance on international norms and the principles of sovereignty (as 
Russia’s blatant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty in 2014 also confirmed) is not the central 
driver for Moscow’s professed concern over humanitarian intervention and democracy 
promotion. Instead, ‘the politics of fear’ about a West that is hostile to Russia have become 
‘major instruments of maintaining authoritarian equilibrium’.66 
Concerns over threats to internal order and regime stability have led to growing centralisation 
and state control over many aspects of domestic politics and society under Putin since 2000. 
This has included restrictions on media freedom and civil society through registration laws, 
punitive law enforcement and other means. These concerns have also influenced Russian 
thinking on traditional security and defence. As such, the Kremlin’s portrayal of external 
political influence, especially by the way of information, as a threat to political stability, is not 
a recent development. Even during the 1990s, at a time of relative democratic freedom, there 
were fears, as Timothy Thomas noted in 1996, that ‘in an unstable public-political and socio-
economic situation, the entire population could serve as a target of influence for an enemy 
campaign’. Management of information in particular was therefore seen as essential to the 
maintenance of stability in the country.67 In 2000, Putin signed the first version of the 
‘Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation’. This addressed subjects, such as the 
moral content of the media and clearly indicated the prioritisation of information as a matter of 
national security.68 The 2014 version of the Military Doctrine for the first time included in its 
section on domestic military dangers the notion of external threats to the information space and 
internal order. Specifically, it referred to the danger of ‘subversive information activities 
against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, 
spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defense of the Motherland’.69 It also listed as one 
of the armed forces’ main tasks the reduction of the ‘risk of using information and 
communication technologies for military-political purposes to undertake actions running 
counter to international law, directed against sovereignty, political independence or territorial 
integrity of states or threatening international peace and security, and global and regional 
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stability’.70 External political influence over the population as a military danger has also been 
reflected in the work of influential strategists, most notably Valerii Gerasimov, the Chief of the 
General Staff, in his now infamous article penned in 2013. In this article, which later 
erroneously became known as the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’,71 he outlined his views on trends in 
Western and specifically US approaches to warfare. Tracing these trends back to the 1991 Gulf 
War, he discussed them within the framework of the Arab Spring and NATO’s intervention in 
Libya. In Gerasimov’s eyes, these conflicts demonstrated the growing potency of non-military 
tools, such as political and information influence over enemy populations, blurring the lines 
between war and peace, with serious implications for the character of war and utility of military 
force.72 The article, which was based on a speech directed at officers at the Academy of War 
Sciences, was an appeal to the Russian military establishment for the need of innovation in 
military thinking in this area as part of the modernisation programme. This was required, in 
Gerasimov’s eyes, in order to avoid falling behind the West in this respect.73 As such, the article 
highlighted the growing centrality of outside political and information influence as a major 
threat to internal order and regime stability in contemporary Russian military thinking.74 
Strengthening conventional capabilities has been one way of securing Russia against the 
potentiality of outside meddling by military force. The renewal of strong conventional 
capabilities, and the development of advanced high-precision weapons in particular, is seen as 
essential for maintaining an edge in modern and future warfare in contemporary Russian 
military thinking, including by strategists like Gerasimov.75 At the same time, growing fears 
over external political and information influence have meant that the need to develop 
capabilities for using non-military tools of warfare, both defensively and offensively, have 
become another important feature in strategic thinking. Since the turn of the millennium they 
have evolved as a central element in the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’, where nuclear, 
conventional and non-military tools are used during war and peace both offensively and 
defensively in what could be described as a ‘combined strategy of containment, deterrence and 
coercion’.76 As Kristin ven Bruusgaard found in her study of ‘strategic deterrence’ in Russian 
military thinking, the concept is not yet fully developed and there is some disagreement 
amongst strategists about its utility. Moreover, the role of non-military tools is the least 
developed element in the concept and it remains unclear how exactly non-military deterrence 
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can be operationalised. However, it is clear that Russia has successfully experimented with 
information operations in the past and the centrality of the topic in contemporary thinking 
indicates how the country may seek to influence opponents in the future.77    
Concerns over internal order and regime stability have led to a process whereby paramilitary 
forces tasked predominantly with internal security and public order have been strengthened 
and modernised. Especially the creation in 2016 of the National Guard Service, a sizeable outfit 
with the combined numerical strength of an estimated 320,000-4230,000 personnel, needs to 
be understood in this context.78 The Service’s remit, according to presidential decree, is to 
ensure ‘the security of the state and society’ and to ‘protect human rights and the freedom of 
citizens’. Its tasks also include cooperation with the Interior Ministry in protecting public order 
during emergency situations.79 Yurii Baluevskii – a former Chief of the General Staff and now 
adviser to the director of the National Guards, Viktor Zolotov – explained the need for this new 
service in a long article published in Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie in May 2017. Following 
a familiar  attack on what he described as Western and US instigated violent conflict and regime 
change in Serbia, Georgia, the Middle East and Ukraine, he asserted that ‘the prevention of 
mass disorder in our cities also needs to be approached with the terminology of war. The coup 
d’etat in Kyiv, of course, was one of the reasons for the creation of the National Guards’. He 
highlighted the Service’s role in countering external attempts to influence the population with 
information:  
Information war, whether we want it or not, will be fought and the National Guards will 
participate in this war and respond to it […]. Countering information warfare is the 
same or even more important for the protection of public security than a violent 
confrontation with thousands of people […]. Information warfare…includes the 
monitoring of public opinion, the analysis of information obtained from various 
sources, the preparation of forecasts and recommendations on instruments that can be 
used to ensure the safety of citizens.  
From this point of view, it is clear what the Service’s task of protecting of the ‘human rights 
and freedoms of citizens’ means in practice. As Baluevskii concluded:  
The National Guards were created not to repress, but to prevent the thoughtless actions 
of those wishing to destabilise the situation within the country in order to push the state 
to the same level of, for example, Libya, Syria and Ukraine today. Our task is to protect 
our citizens, public order and security and, ultimately, to prevent colour revolutions.80 
 
Conclusions 
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The Russian Federation’s views of future conflict and the utility of force were never limited to 
small wars and insurgencies. Local conflicts were the most immediate concern in the early 
1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the eruption of several violent 
conflicts on its periphery and within its own borders. Initially, Moscow sought multilateral 
approaches and cooperation. Within the CIS such cooperation was seen as expedient for 
legitimacy and financial burden sharing. Regarding the West, joint peacekeeping in the Balkans 
and cooperation with NATO in various emerging security challenges were considered useful 
for improving the armed forces’ capabilities in these areas and as opportunities for Russia to 
solve important international problems on a par with other great powers.  However, Moscow 
never signalled the intention to integrate as a member of the Euro-Atlantic security community, 
where a demilitarised Russia would take a position subordinate to the United States. As soon 
as it emerged that neither its CIS neighbours nor the West shared its long-term vision of the 
region as its exclusive ‘sphere of interest’ and Moscow felt that it was being side-lined in 
international decision making, the need for strong conventional forces returned to the centre of 
Russian thinking and it adopted a more confrontational approach. During the 1990s the 
methods of confrontation were limited to official rhetoric and doctrine, because of the 
constraints of a weak economy and decaying armed forces. As the economy and military 
recovered from 2000 onwards, the Kremlin’s possibilities for pursuing its interests regional 
and global ambitions changed, and enabled more aggressive action.  
The prioritisation of military reforms since 2000, which accelerated with the modernisation 
programme announced in 2008, has meant that Russia today is again in a position to deter what 
it sees as the West’s encroachment into its declared ‘sphere of interest’ and to ensure that its 
views on the course of international developments, like in Syria, are taken into account. This 
poses a serious challenge to its neighbours, because of the restrictions this poses on their pursuit 
of an independent foreign policy, particularly regarding future membership in NATO and the 
European Union. For the United States and the West, Russia’s apparent willingness and 
confidence to use its military for the pursuit of interests also beyond the CIS region, will have 
to factor into future decisions over the use of military force, because the danger of spiralling 
tensions and escalation needs to be taken into account. Russia’s neighbours and NATO have 
started taking measures intended to deter the eventuality of future aggression by a Kremlin 
increasingly confident in the utility of its armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. The 
potential success of containing Russia in this way is far from guaranteed, because it plays into 
the hands of a political elite relying on the instrumentalization of the rhetoric of a hostile West 
in order to justify democratic crackdowns for the purpose of regime consolidation. 
